

U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service



OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



Date:

MAR 1 0 2000

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under § 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

Self-represented

identifying data descent to prevent clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,

Z-Ferrance M. O'Reilly, Director Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The waiver application was denied by the Officer in Charge, Athens, Greece, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Israel who was found to be inadmissible to the United States by a consular officer under § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The applicant entered the United States as a nonimmigrant in September 1975 with authorization to remain until November 1, 1975. The applicant failed to depart and remained until 1996 without ever having adjusted his status to permanent resident. He married his first wife in 1974, separated from her in 1974, but was not legally divorced until 1986. His second marriage to ______in New York in 1976 became a lawful common-law marriage following that 1986 divorce from and their establishing a residence in Texas in 1989. He is the beneficiary of an approved immediate relative visa petition. The applicant seeks a waiver of this permanent bar to admission as provided under § 212(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h), to reside with his spouse and adult child in the United States.


The officer in charge concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed upon his United States citizen wife and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, the applicant's wife (hereafter referred to as states that there is actual extreme hardship to her, to her daughter, and to her grandson due to the absence of her husband and the household's low income. States that the family unit has suffered undue emotional distress and considerable financial loss. presents an October 1996 psychological evaluation which disabilities, Attentionshe two indicates that has Deficit/Hyperactivity disorder Visual-Motor and a states that she has taken a leave of absence from disability. her teaching position and has taken a position with the Texas Department of Human Services since February 1999 at a lower salary. liscusses the various medicines that have been prescribed for states that her husband's return to Israel after 21 years is the rehabilitation that he needed.

The applicant's daughter, discusses her marriage on October 22, 1997, and subsequent separation on that same day, the birth of the applicant's grandson, her filing for divorce, the lack of child support payments until August 1998, and her inability to attend college full-time.

The record reflects that the applicant was convicted of grand theft in 1988, sentenced to 120 days in jail and placed on probation for 5 years.

Section 212(a) CLASSES OF ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS OR ADMISSION.-Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are



- (2) CRIMINAL AND RELATED GROUNDS. -
- (A) CONVICTION OF CERTAIN CRIMES. -
- (i) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of-
 - (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime,...is inadmissible.

Section 212(h) WAIVER OF SUBSECTION (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), (B), (D), AND (E).-The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive application of subparagraph (A)(i)(I),...if-

- (1) (A) in the case of any immigrant it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that-
- (i)...the activities for which the alien is inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before the date of the alien's application for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status,
- (ii) the admission to the United States of such alien would not be contrary to the national welfare, safety, or security of the United States, and
 - (iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or
- (B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien's denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien; and
- (2) the Attorney General, in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or for adjustment of status.

No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the case of an alien who has been convicted of (or who has admitted committing acts that constitute) murder or criminal acts involving torture, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit murder or a criminal act involving

torture. No waiver shall be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either since the date of such admission the alien has been convicted of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully resided continuously in the United States for a period of not less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initiation of proceedings to remove the alien from the United States. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this subsection.

Here, fewer than 15 years have elapsed since the applicant committed his last violation. Therefore, he is ineligible for the waiver provided by § 212(h)(1)(A) of the Act.

Section 212(h)(1)(B) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar resulting admission frominadmissibility under 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. The key term in the provision is "extreme." Therefore, only in cases of great actual or prospective injury to the qualifying relative(s) will the bar be removed. Common results of the bar, such as separation or financial difficulties, in themselves, are insufficient to warrant approval of an application unless combined with much more extreme impacts. Matter of Ngai, 19 I&N Dec. 245 (Comm. 1984). "Extreme hardship" to an alien himself cannot be considered in determining eligibility for a § 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility. Matter of Shaughnessy, 12 I&N Dec. 810 (BIA 1968).

The court held in <u>INS v. Jong Ha Wang</u>, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

The assertion of financial hardship to the applicant's spouse advanced in the record is contradicted by the fact that, pursuant to § 213A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1183a, and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. 213a, the person who files the immigrant visa petition (the applicant's spouse and daughter) must execute a Form I-864 (Affidavit of Support) which is legally enforceable in behalf of a beneficiary (the applicant) who is an immediate relative or a family-sponsored immigrant when an applicant applies for an immigrant visa. The statute and the regulations do not provide for an alien beneficiary to execute an affidavit of support in behalf of a U.S. citizen or resident alien petitioner. Therefore, a claim that an alien beneficiary is needed for the purpose of supporting a citizen or resident alien petitioner can only be considered as a hardship in rare instances.

In <u>Silverman v. Rogers</u>, 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), the court stated that "even assuming that the federal government had no right either to prevent a marriage or destroy it, we believe that here it has done nothing more than to say that the residence of one of the marriage partners may not be in the United States."

It is noted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in <u>Carnalla-Muñoz v. INS</u>, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980), held that an after-acquired equity (referred to as an after-acquired family tie in <u>Matter of Tijam</u>, Interim Decision 3372 (BIA 1998) need not be accorded great weight by the district director in considering discretionary weight. The applicant in the present matter entered the United States in 1975 as a nonimmigrant visitor, remained longer than authorized and married his second U.S. citizen spouse in 1976, although that marriage did not become legal until the termination of his first marriage in 1986 and his residence in Texas in 1989. The applicant now seeks relief based on that afteracquired equity. However, as previously noted, a consideration of the Attorney General's discretion is applicable only after extreme hardship has been established.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, fails to establish the existence of hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the deportation of a family member that reaches the level of extreme as envisioned by Congress if the applicant is not allowed to return to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether he merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(h), the burden of establishing that the application merits approval remains entirely with the applicant. Matter of Ngai, supra. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.